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This  paper  sets  out  to  show  that  a  risk-averse  sport  fanatic  could  hedge  his 
happiness  by  betting  on  the  opposition.  The  literature  surrounding  happiness, 
risk-  and  loss  aversion  is  explored  and  a  model  is  developed  to  explain  the 
happiness a fan derives from a match. It is shown that expectation as to what the 
result may be plays a vital role in the emotions awakened. An upset victory is 
much sweeter than one where one’s team is the outright favourite. Expectations 
determine  the  odds  offered  by  bookies.  Here  lies  the  beauty  of  this  strategy. 
Suffering an unexpected loss is more painful than an anticipated beating. That 
being  said,  the  payout  from  betting  on  the  underdog  opposition  (which 
subsequently won) would be larger the more unexpected the result was. To bet 
on the opposition to hedge one’s happiness appears to be a plausible strategy for 
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Hedging one’s Happiness 
1. Introduction 
It may have lasted only a day or two, but the pain had some bite. South Africa was the odds-on 
favourites to win their quarter-final against New Zealand in the 2011 ICC Cricket World Cup 
which was played in India and Sri Lanka. Unfortunately it did not turn out as planned and South 
Africa was bowled out for a mere 172 runs, 50 short of the target. South Africa was knocked out 
of the tournament and a country’s hopes were left in tatters. Would it have been smart if I had 
placed R200 on the Black Caps to win? The odds were 11 to 5. Would the R440 I could have 
won have eased the pain of losing the match? 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether it is rational for a risk-averse sport fanatic to 
hedge his happiness by betting on the opposition. The paper will show that sport fans conform 
to the set-point theory of happiness and that expectations play a major role in the joy derived 
from watching sport. Section 2 will briefly review the pertinent literature on happiness, risk and 
loss aversion. A model for happiness is developed in section 3. The element of gambling is 
added in section 4 before the paper is concluded in section 5.     
2. Risk and happiness  
The question posed by this paper is whether a sports fan could hedge his happiness by betting 
on the opposition. This section investigates why a hypothetical sports fan would want to do 
this. This requires reviewing the literature on happiness to search for clues as to how agents 
perceive winning, losing and financial gains. Risk aversion seems an obvious starting point for 
exploring the rationale behind hedging. Loss aversion and consumption smoothing, or in this 
case happiness smoothing, could also contribute to the answer. 
2.1. Happiness  
There is a huge body of research with respect to happiness and the causes thereof. During the 
last number of decades economists have thrown in their two pennies worth on this issue, an 1 
 
issue psychologists have been pondering on for centuries. (Like Richard Easterlin (2003), this 
paper uses the terms happiness, utility, joy, entertainment and satisfaction interchangeably.)  
There  are  many  theories  surrounding  general  happiness.  Set-point  theory  has  risen  to 
prominence during the latter part of the previous century. Set-point theory states that one 
always reverts to a certain level of happiness over time and that increased income, marriage, 
divorce, etc. only bring temporary variation from the mean level of happiness (Easterlin: 2003). 
Many claim that this set-point is determined mainly by genetic factors and that life experiences 
contribute only momentary changes in happiness. As Easterlin (2003) points out, the set-point 
theory of happiness is not without its sceptics. Major life events, such as serious disability, are 
likely to have a lasting impact on a person’s happiness.  
As to the causes of happiness, theories are similarly abundant. Apart from the joy derived from 
watching and winning matches, this paper is interested in income as source of utility. Here 
hedonic behaviour, comparison and aspiration theory, as well as diminishing marginal utility of 
income all come into play. The last refers to the phenomenon that the effect on happiness of a 
R100  rise  in  real  income  becomes  progressively  less  with  higher  levels  of  initial  wealth 
(Easterlin: 2005). 
There is a paradox in the literature that increased income does not translate into increased 
average happiness over samples (Easterlin: 2005). The consensus among authors is that relative 
considerations hold the key to Easterlin’s paradox (Clark et al.: 2008). In short, it boils down to 
keeping up with the Joneses. As one’s income rises, one becomes surrounded by new peers and 
is left aspiring to higher levels of wealth. The evidence points to the fact that if income does 
affect happiness, it is relative and not absolute levels of income that is important (Frank: 2004). 
Clark et al. (2008) states that this comparison of income can be to others, but also to oneself in 
the past.  
2.2. Risk and loss aversion   
The idea of hedging one’s happiness should be seen in the same light as buying insurance. The 
behavioural tendency to insure is known as risk aversion. People would rather buy insurance at 
predefined  prices  than  be  exposed  to  the  risk  of  larger,  uncertain  financial  losses  (Cather: 2 
 
2010). Risk-averse individuals would choose a certain payoff over an uncertain one, even if the 
payoff for the sure bet  is less. A risk-averse agent would thus prefer an assured payoff of 
something less than R50, rather than a 50:50 shot at winning R100, irrespective of the fact that 
the expected value of the gamble is higher.  
Rabin and Thaler (2007) point out that should an agent reject a 50:50 gamble to win R110 or 
lose R100 (a gamble with a positive expected value), he would reject a R100 gamble to win 
R111 as well, in fact he would reject any gamble where he could lose R100. This is because of 
diminishing marginal utility with respect to wealth (Cather: 2010). Under this logic the agent 
would choose not to take the gamble even if he stood the chance to win outrageous amounts 
of money. Turning down a 50:50 gamble to win R10 million seems all but rational. Risk aversion 
does thus not relate the same way to small stakes as it does to larger stakes (Rabin: 2000).  
The answer to this phenomenon lies with loss aversion. This element of risk preferences shies 
away from expected-utility theory and explains medium scale risk aversion (Rabin: 2000). The 
theory of loss aversion states that agents are more sensitive to losses than to gains relative to a 
reference point (Abdellaoui et al.: 2007). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) believed agents are up 
to twice as sensitive to losses as they are to gains of similar magnitude.  
Harinck et al. (2007) challenged the consensus that “losses loom larger than gains” by stating 
that loss aversion is reversed when the stakes are small. They use the hedonic principle as basis 
for their argument. Hedonism entails maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. Harinck et al. 
(2007) comments that people endeavour to discount negative experiences in order to minimize 
their pain. People would want to erase sadness from memory and put it behind them, as it 
were. Harinck et al. (2007) claimed that people anticipate losses to be worse than they turn out 
to be. People underestimate their own capacity to discount negative experiences. They also 
learn that they can easily overcome small losses. Thus, by gaining experience and discounting, 
negative emotions can be greatly reduced to the point where “gains (may) loom larger than 
losses”.  This  is  only  plausible  for  small  losses,  since  major  negative  experiences  are  more 
difficult to discount.   3 
 
2.3. Risk and happiness in the context of this paper 
In the context of sport supporting, one would derive joy from a match in many different ways. 
Besides the understandable satisfaction winning brings, watching a tightly contested spectacle 
also has great entertainment value. Set-point theory offers an explanation as to the emotional 
variance  a  sports  fan  experiences  over  the  course  of  a  season.  There  are  question  marks 
surrounding the set-point theory of happiness, but they may be disregarded for the purposes of 
this paper. The reason for this is that, in the bigger scheme of things and compared to divorce 
or disability – issues that the critique of set point theory deal with –, losing a rugby match is 
trivial. The time frame is also scaled down from one or two years, in the case of major life 
events, to merely days. Set-point theory is thus plausible in the context of this paper.  
It is widely accepted that people show preference to a stable path of consumption over time. If 
agents derive utility from consumption smoothing, is it irrational that sport fans would want to 
smooth their happiness? One can of course argue that this would take the fun out of watching 
sport, but this paper entertains the thought that a risk-averse sports fan would want to hedge 
his happiness. 
Loss  aversion  seems  exceedingly  relevant  to  a  sports  fan,  especially  since  beating  a  much 
weaker side would not be experienced as vividly as losing to them. In the context of this paper 
loss aversion points to the fact that a fan that would be content after a victory, but morbid after 
a loss. In essence it boils down to expectations. Losing a match one had expected to win would 
be more painful than losing a match where the outcome could not be predicted or where a loss 
was anticipated. 
3. The model 
There are many factors that contribute to the enjoyment people experience from watching 
sport. Many people watch the Olympics or other tournaments without necessarily having the 
proverbial  horse  in  the  race.  This  points  to  the  fact  that  winning  is  not  everything.  Thus, 
pleasure derived from sport goes further than just the result. 4 
 
If  we  consider  some  of  the  factors  in  the  sport  fan’s  happiness  function,  the  result  is  the 
obvious place to start. Then there is the quality of the game. Many people watch sport for its 
“beauty”.  A  game  of  running  rugby,  for  example,  is  a  far  greater  spectacle  than  30  men 
wrestling in the mud for control of the ball. The quality of the game is of course a function of 
countless variables: the weather; game plan; injuries; talent; opposition; tournament situation 
along with pressure, etc. The result is to a large extent a function of the opposition and current 
form,  with  home  ground  advantage  also  playing  a  part.  Enjoyment  derived  from  victory  is 
increased if the game is in a tournament as supposed to a friendly or a dead rubber. Matches 
between fierce rivals also bring extra emotions to the surface. 
The joy sports fans draw from a match is thus the quality of the contest added to the result. The 
latter is made exponentially larger the more important the match is. With “importance” this 
paper alludes to the impact that stronger opposition, rivalry, location and tournament situation 
makes. Much of the enjoyment derived from the result of the match is correlated to whether 
said result was anticipated. 
The following model depicts a sports fan’s happiness function  for a specific match: 
 
In this model the result is denoted by , and is merely positive or negative.   would equal (1) 
for a win and (-1) for a loss. Later on the possibility of wins and losses not treated equally will 
be discussed. The strength of the opponents are represented by  . It is in the form of a scale, 
with a stronger team receiving a higher value. As the purpose of this paper is not calibration 
this scale will stay hypothetical, say 1 to 10, with the strongest side in the world receiving a 10. 
 represents the rivalry between the two participating teams, this too can be represented by a 
scale.  The  fiercer  the  rivalry,  the  higher  value    will  be.   is  used  to  indicate  tournament 
situations.  As  mentioned,  enjoyment  derived  from  victory  is  increased  if  the  game  is  in  a 
tournament (semi-finals or finals even more so) as opposed to a friendly or a dead rubber. The 
opposition, rivalry and tournament conditions   can thus be seen as a measure of the 5 
 
match’s importance. The more important the game, the higher value   will receive in the 
model. 
As indicated, expectations can be presumed to play a vital role in the enjoyment derived from 
the result of a match. A win is much more enjoyable if the result was unexpected. The same is 
true for a loss. More unexpected results evoke greater emotion. In the model expectation is 
represented by  . The impact of expectation is felt exponentially. Expectation is measured on a 
scale from zero to one. If the result was expected,   is closer to zero and if the result was 
unexpected,   is closer to one.  
As explained earlier, winning is not everything. People derive joy from the quality of the contest 
as well. The quality of the game is represented by   in the model. This can also be represented 
by a scale from zero upwards. One might even argue that   could drop below zero for a 
particularly poor spectacle. Calibration is not the aim of this paper and thus for our purpose   
will be measured from zero, increasing as the contest becomes more entertaining. 
Table 1 illustrates some results from the model to show how it works. In this table the quality of 
the  game,  opposition,  rivalry  and  tournament  conditions  are  kept  stable
2.  One  should 
remember that the expectation before a match is a function of relative strength. Therefore one 
cannot hold the expectation variable ( ) constant and compare the utility derived from beating 
a strong team to beating a weaker team. The value of   in this paper is merely an indication of 
happiness. Higher values point to greater joy.     
Results from Happiness Model 
Result    
Unexpected win   3.6 
Expected win   1.4 
Expected loss   -1.4 
Unexpected loss  -3.6 
                 Table 1 
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4. Add the element of gambling 
Gambling on sport is a multibillion Rand industry. There is a huge body of research on betting 
strategies, ways to beat the system and how bookmakers stay solvent. This paper is more 
interested in the role expectations plays in both betting odds and happiness with respect to 
sport. As explained earlier, expectations prior to a match plays a big role in a sport fan’s joy 
derived from the result.  
There are different ways bookmakers set sport betting odds. It is normally expressed as “α to σ” 
with the payout being “α” profit for every bet of “σ” placed. Odds represent the probability that 
an event will occur. The probability of the event occurring is equal to   . A 6-4 bet would thus 
represent a 40% probability that the event would occur. In this case a winning bet of R40 would 
pay out R100, R60 profit and the original bet of R40. Bookmakers adjust the odds to ensure that 
they make a profit. If the probability that an event would occur is 40%, bookmakers would 
normally set the odds at 6-5 instead of 6-4 to guarantee that a profit is made. In the context of 
this paper, this vigorish (or bookmaker’s fee) is not of particular importance. Odds are set either 
by bookmakers or by systems where the bets placed influence the odds. Odds are thus an 
indication  of  what  bookmakers  or  the  public  in  general  believe  will  happen  in  the  match. 
Betting companies have a high rate of forecasting accuracy (Spann & Skiera: 2009). This is to be 
expected as betting companies offering inefficient odds would soon be out of business. It is 
thus rational to believe that the expectation of betting companies and our hypothetical sports 
fan would be more or less the same. 
The aim of this paper it to see whether it would be rational for a risk-averse sports fan to bet on 
the opposition in order to hedge his happiness. Betting odds will now be added to the model 
explained in the previous section.        
 7 
 
In this new model,  represents the wager placed in monetary terms.   is a similar term to the 
result  variable,  but  where   receives  a  value  of  (+1)  if  the  supported  team  wins  and  (-1) 
otherwise,  is given the value of (+1) if the opposition wins and (0) if that is not the case.   is 
thus named the “opposition win” variable. If the result of the match was a near certainty 
beforehand (say probability = 0.9) then the odds would have been 1 to 9 (a payout of R1 for 
every R9 wagered). Therefore, if the fan had placed a R90 wager, he would have got R100 in 
return, R10 of which would have been profit. Remember that   represents a scale of zero to 
one.  If  the  result  was  expected,   is  closer  to  zero.  For  this  very  predictable  result  (90% 
certainty),    would  receive  a  value  of  (0.1).  This  can  be  transformed  into  probability  by 
subtracting   from one (it is an expected result, therefore  =0.1 and probability = (1- ) = 0.9). 
The  winnings  in  this  case  can  be  calculated  by  multiplying    by  the  amount  wagered 
( ).  As  one  can  see  this  produces  the  same  winnings  as  those  calculated 
earlier.   is the variable for the monetary cost of one “unit” of happiness. This will vary 
from  person  to  person  and  will  influence  how  big  the  winnings  must  be  before  a  fan  is 
indifferent to the result of the match. What would our hypothetical supporter pay to see the 
Springboks win? What price does he put on the result? 
The new component of the model can be simplified as follows: 
Should the supported team be victorious
3: 
 
Should the supported team lose
4: 
 
                                                           
3 This means that the opposing team loses, therefore =0 and =(+1). This also means that the 
fan does not win the bet.   
4 This means that the opposing team wins, therefore =1,  =(-1) and the fan wins the bet. 8 
 
One can see that should the supported team win, the fan will get the satisfaction of winning but 
lose the wager he placed. Should the opposition win, he will suffer the pain of losing but win 
the bet. 
Table 2 illustrates some results from the new model to show how it works. In this table the 
quality of the game, opposition, rivalry, wager, and tournament conditions are kept stable
5. 
Results from the Happiness Model with Gambling   
Result 
Without 
Hedging  =150  =200  =250  =300   =350 
Unexpected win   3.6  3  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3 
Expected win   1.4  0.7  0.9  1  1  1.1 
Expected loss   -1.4  -0.5  -0.8  -0.9  -1  -1 
Unexpected loss  -3.6  -0.3  -1.1  -1.6  -2  -2.2 
Table 2 
Graph 1 
I want to stress again that the aim of this paper is not calibration and that the monetary cost of 
one “unit” of happiness will vary from person to person. Although all the variables in the model 
will vary from person to person and the bets they would be willing to place would not be the 
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same, the model would still work because the   variable should equalize it over samples. 
Loss aversion is also not factored into the model in this paper. Here positive and negative 
feelings are assumed to be of equal magnitude. In reality, the literature tells us that this is not 
true. The possibility of loss aversion reversal is also not covered here for it would take empirical 
testing to prove. What Table 2 does show is that happiness hedging for sport fanatics is very 
plausible. It is especially true for unexpected losses. The bottom row of Table 2 shows that the 
pain from unexpected losses can be greatly reduced by betting on the opposing team. Both 
ends of the spectrum are shortened, but the lower end more so; this is clearly visible in Graph 
1.  
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper set out to show that a risk-averse sport fanatic could hedge his happiness. A model is 
developed to explain the happiness a fan derives from a match. It is shown that expectation as 
to what the result may be plays a vital role in the emotions awakened. An upset victory is much 
sweeter than one where one’s team is the outright favourite. Expectations determine the odds 
offered by bookies. Here lies the beauty of this strategy. Suffering an unexpected loss is more 
painful than an anticipated beating. That being said, the payout from betting on the underdog 
opposition (which subsequently won) would be larger the more unexpected the result was. 
Calibration  and  refinement  of  this  model  would  probably  be  far  too  complex,  but  the 
underlying theory cannot be disregarded. To bet on the opposition to hedge one’s happiness 
appears to be a plausible strategy for an economically risk-averse sports fan – especially if one 
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